In this paper we develop a Cournot competition model between two firms located in a two-dimensional circular city. This city consists of a circumference and all the points in its interior for which movement between any two points can be made in a straight line. Firms have zero costs and market demand is symmetrically linear. We show that there exists a single state of equilibrium in which the firms agglomerate in the centre of the circle.
I
Over recent years, a broad set of theoretical contributions has developed around the notion of spatial competition along the lines of Bertrand and Cournot. Noteworthy contributions in the context of Cournot competition are those by Hamilton et al. (1989) and Anderson and Neven (1991) , who situate their study in the linear city model introduced by Hotelling (1929) . In contrast with what happens under Bertrand competition, where firms tend to be dispersed (see D'Aspremont et al., 1979) , the cited studies conclude that firms agglomerate at a point when they compete in location/quantity. Pal (1998) applied the Cournot competition model between two firms to Salop's (1979) circular city model (note that the circular city of Salop is actually a circumference), concluding that in this context companies occupy equidistant points. Later, Matsushima (2001) proved that in the case of an even number of firms in the Salop city, half of them cluster around one point and the other half at the opposite point. All these studies consider the demand function p = a -bq, where p is price, q is quantity and a, b are positive constants.
One of the main findings of the seminal Hotelling model is that firms agglomerate. We wonder if this result for one-dimensional spaces (e.g. street, beach) is valid for wider and more realistic definitions of economic territories captured in two-dimensional spaces (e.g. a whole city, region). Hence, we premise a circular city in the literal sense of the word 'circular', i.e. a city consisting of a circumference and all the points in its interior for which movement between any two points can be made in a straight line.
1 Both Hotelling and Salop models feature 'one-dimensionality' in the sense that at each point there is only one possible direction for movement. The main contribution of this short paper is the analysis, to our knowledge for the first time, of a Cournot duopoly in a two-dimensional economic space 2 (i.e. a whole city, region). Finally, we employ quadratic transport costs.
3 Such cost functions have been used in earlier studies, as in many cases they ensure the existence of equilibrium (Caplin and Nalebuff, 1991; Tabuchi, 1994) . 4 
T M
We consider a circle D with radius 1 (D = {(x, y) ʦ ‫ޒ‬ 2 : x 2 + y 2 £ 1}) in which a set of consumers is uniformly distributed. Within the circle there are two firms, C 1 and C 2 , which produce and sell the same type of product to consumers. The two companies have the same technology and both have zero marginal production costs (without loss of generality). The two stages of competition between the firms are as follows: in a first phase, the firms choose their location; and then, once the location of their competitors is noted, each company chooses the quantity to offer at each point (x, y) of the circle in order to maximize its benefits. Let q i (x, y) (for i ʦ {1, 2}) be the quantity supplied by firm C i at point (x, y), and Q(x, y) = q 1 (x, y) + q 2 (x, y) the total quantity supplied by the two firms. We consider the demand function p(x, y) = a -bQ (x, y) , where p(x, y) is the price of the product in (x, y) and a, b are positive constants. The firms must transport the products from their point of production to the consumers. The transport of the merchandise must be carried out in a straight line, with the firms themselves taking charge of all Cournot Competition in a Two-dimensional Circular City 41 the costs of this transport, which will be considered proportional to the square of the distance covered (with proportionality constant t > 0). Fig. 1 ) (1) By solving the linear equation system we obtain that the quantities offered for each firm and the total quantity at (x, y) are, respectively, as follows:
To ensure that both firms always serve the whole market, we assume that a > 8t (by taking x i = 0 and y i = -1, we obtain q i (0, 1) = (a -8t)/3b). We conclude from (2) and (3) that C i 's profit at any point (x, y) ʦ D is (4) 
x y q x y a bQ x y t x x y y , , ,
The Manchester School Theorem. In the location-quantity game, there is a single subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, where both firms locate at the centre of the circle.
Proof: To show that (0, 0) is a Nash equilibrium it is sufficient to check that, if (x i , y i ) = (0, 0), then C j (for j π i) maximizes its profit by situating itself in (x j , y j ) = (0, 0). Indeed, let us suppose that C 2 is situated in (0, 0). Then Since P 1 (x 1 , y 1 ) is a differentiable function in ‫ޒ‬ 2 , the global maximum 5 of 
Hence, we conclude that (0, 0) is the global maximum of P 1 (x 1 , y 1 ) in D.
The same argument can be used to prove that C 2 maximizes its profit in (0, 0) if C 1 locates in (0, 0), and hence we can conclude that (0, 0) is an equilibrium point. Note that, in fact, we also have shown that if (x i , y i ) = (0, 0), then C j (i π j) obtains its minimum profit when it is located 'as far as possible' from C i , i.e. at any point on the exterior circumference of D.
Next we show that it is, in fact, the unique Nash equilibrium. Let (a i , b i ) ʦ D be C i 's location in an equilibrium for i ʦ {1, 2}. We can suppose (without loss of generality) that a 2 = 0.
7 The proof will be divided into four steps.
Step 1: a 1 = 0 (both firms are located on the same diameter). Since 6 Both profits are positive since 3a 2 -15at + 31t 2 = a(3a -15t) + 31t 2 > a(24t -15t) + 31t 2 = 9at + 31t 2 > 0. 7 Otherwise, we just have to move round the circle until C 2 's location in equilibrium is on the y axis. 8 The roots of ∂P 1 /∂y 1 (x 1 , b 1 ) are real numbers because 2a
In particular, since [2a + t(-3 -4b 1 2 + 2b 2 2 )] 1/2 /2÷t > 1, then x 1 = 0 is a global maximum of P 1 (x 1 , b 1 ) when x 1 ʦ [-1, 1].
Step 2: b 1 · b 2 £ 0. (b 1 and b 2 cannot be, at the same time, either positive or negative real numbers). Suppose b 2 < 0. To deduce b 1 ≥ 0, we prove that C 1 's profit is higher in (0, 0) than at any other point (0, y 1 ) with y 1 ʦ [-1, 0):
Since 2xty 1 /9b < 0 if y 1 < 0, it is sufficient to show that h(y 1 ) = 2ay 1 + t[-2y 1 3 + 2b 2 + y 1 (-3 + 2b 2
2 )] is negative for all y 1 ʦ [-1, 0):
and thus -{[2a -t(3 -2b 2 2 )]/6t} 1/2 is a local minimum and {[2a -t(3 -2b 2
2 )]/6t} 1/2 is a local maximum. Therefore, h is strictly increasing in [-{[2a -t(3 -2b 2 2 )]/6t} 1/2 , 0) Besides, -{[2a -t(3 -2b 2 2 )]/6t} 1/2 < -1, and hence h is strictly increasing in [-1, 0) . Finally, h(0) = 2tb 2 < 0 and therefore h(y 1 ) < 0 for all y 1 ʦ [-1, 0).
Analogously we can check that b 1 £ 0 if b 2 > 0. This step allows us to suppose that in any equilibrium C 1 is situated at (0, b 1 ), with b 1 ʦ [0, 1], and C 2 is situated at (0, b 2 ), with b 2 ʦ [-1, 0].
Step 3: b 1 = -b 2 (both firms locate symmetrically with respect to the origin). We proceed to show that necessarily b 1 £ -b 2 , or, equivalently, that
If y 1 > -b 2 , then 2pt(y 1 + b 2 )/9b > 0 and thus it suffices to show that k y a y t y y y The roots of k¢(y 1 ) are real numbers because 12a + 2t(-9 + 2b 2 2 ) > 96t -18t > 0.
and this last inequality holds because 6a
2 )] > 0, and thus k(y 1 ) > 0 for all y 1 ʦ (-b 2 , 1]. In the same manner we can see that b 2 ≥ -b 1 and so the assertion follows.
Step 4 
It is thus proved that the unique position of equilibrium for this model is obtained when both firms are situated in the very centre of the circle. Therefore, we extend the conclusions of previous studies on the Cournot model to economic spaces (i.e. city, region) more realistically represented by a circle when this is defined as the line and the area that it encloses.
W I
The equilibrium location (0, 0) of both firms ensures that the total quantity distributed over the whole circular city to consumers by the two firms is maximum. Indeed, with the notation above, such a total quantity in terms of the firm's equilibrium locations (x 1 , x 2 ) and (y 1 , y 2 ) is given by the expression ᑫ is a differentiable function in ‫ޒ‬ 2 ¥ ‫ޒ‬ 2 and hence the global maximum 12 of
The unique solution of the system is (x 1 , x 2 , y 1 , y 2 ) = (0, 0, 0, 0) and
Clearly, p(2a -3t)/3b < p(2a -t)/3b, and thus Q reaches its maximum at (x 1 , x 2 ) = (0, 0) and (y 1 , y 2 ) = (0, 0). As a consequence, the total price paid by consumers in terms of the firm's equilibrium locations (x 1 , x 2 ) and (y 1 , y 2 ) , , , 9  6  2 4  3  3 , , , , 
